How Definite is the 4th Amendment's Line at the Entrance of Your Home?

In 1980, 31 years ago, the United Supreme Court clearly said

"The Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.  Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not be reasonably be crossed without a warrant."

Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980). This week, with its opinion in  Kentucky v. King, the Supreme Court made that line much less firm.  Kentucky v. King, No. 09-1272 (May 16, 2011).

In King police followed a suspected drug dealer to an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside anapartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As soon as the officers began knocking, they heard noises coming from the apartment.  The officers announced their intent to enter the apartment, kicked in the door, and found respondent and others.  (incidentally, and unfortunately for Mr. King, none of these people were the original drug dealer the police were following) The police saw drugs in plain view during a protective sweep of the apartment and found additional evidence during a subsequent search.

Circumstances qualify as “exigent” when there is an imminent risk of death or serious injury, or danger that evidence will be immediately destroyed, or that a suspect will escape.  However, there's an exception to the exception; it's called "the police-created exigency exception."  Police cannot create or manufacture the exigency themselves for purposes of contravening the warrant requirement.  That was Mr. King's (losing) argument in this case (that the police created the exigency themselves). 


While Mr. King lost, the US Supreme Court has some strongly worded "advice," in dicta, for citizens in its recent opinion.  So take heed, know, and exercise your constitutional rights:

"When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497–498 (1983). (“[H]e may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way”).When the police knock on a door but the occupants choosenot to respond or to speak, “the investigation will havereached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide.” Chambers, 395 F. 3d, at 577 (Sutton, J., dissenting). And even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time.  Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue."

So King leaves us to wonder, as Justice Ginsberg does in her dissent

"How 'secure' do our homes remain if police, armed with no warrant, can pound on doors at will and, on hearing sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evidence of unlawful activity?"